We present a new algorithm for polynomial time learning of optimal behavior in stochastic games. This algorithm incorporates and integrates important recent results of Kearns and Singh 5] in reinforcement learning and of Monderer and Tennenholtz 7] in repeated games. In stochastic games, the agent must cope with the existence of an adversary whose actions can be arbitrary. In particular, this adversary can withhold information about the game matrix by refraining from (or rarely) performing certain actions. This forces upon us an exploration vs. exploitation dilemma more complex than in Markov decision processes. Namely, given information about particular parts of a game matrix, how much e ort should the agent invest in learning its unknown parts. We explain and address these issues within the class of single controller stochastic games and explain how these ideas can be extended to stochastic games in general.
Introduction
Stochastic games (SGs) extend Markov decision processes (MDPs) to a multi-agent environment. In classical stochastic games 9], two players, the agent and the adversary, engage in a series of competitive interactions. Thus, in di erence with MDPs, each state in an SG is associated with a zero-sum game between the agent and the adversary. Following each game, each of the players obtains some reward and both end up in a new state (i.e., game). The reward obtained by the players is a function of the current state and their actions; the new state is a stochastic function of the current game and the players' actions.
Much like in MDPs, the agent's goal is to nd an optimal (or near-optimal) policy, i.e., a mapping from states (i.e., games) to actions. However, unlike in MDPs, such optimal policies are typically mixed, i.e., each game is mapped to a probability distribution over actions rather than to a particular action. The de nition of the optimization criteria for SGs is similar to that of MDPs, and include cumulative discounted reward, cumulative undiscounted reward (where the number of steps is nite but unbounded), average discounted reward, and average undiscounted reward; we concentrate on this last criterion. However, in di erence to MDPs, there need not be stationary optimal policies for in nite horizon stochastic games when the average undiscounted reward criterion is used, neither are there polynomial time algorithms for computing solutions for such games. However, there is an important class of stochastic games in which stationary optimal policies in the in nite horizon average undiscounted reward case exist, and they can be computed in polynomial time. This type of game is called single-controller stochastic game (SCSG) 3, 8, 10] , a name which derives from the fact that the state (or game) transitions depend on the action of the agent alone. Hence, the adversary's action in uences the rewards only. In this paper, we concentrate on learning in SCSGs. As it turns out, our results can be extended to the general case of stochastic games, and we shall discuss the required re nements later on.
The learning algorithm that we present is based on Kearns and Singh's (KS) E 3 algorithm 5]. E 3 is a model-based learning algorithm (i.e., one in which a partial model of the MDP is formed) that has introduced a number of new concepts and ideas in the area of reinforcement learning. The extension of these ideas into SGs raises a number of issues that stem from the existence of an adversary whose behavior is unknown. In particular, this adversary can, at will, hide information from the agent by refraining from taking particular actions or by rarely playing such actions. This means that, unlike MDPs where the transition function and rewards can be made known to the agent with su cient exploration, certain aspects of the model may never be known to the agent, or may take an unbounded time to learn. Therefore, we cannot emulate the two phase approach of the E 3 algorithm. There, the agent rst attempts to learn enough about the model to obtain near-optimal return, after which it enters an exploitation phase. Instead, we will have to allow for the possibility of continuous learning.
Indeed, in stochastic games, a more complicated form of the exploration vs. exploitation problem arises. Recall that the exploration vs. exploitation dilemma refers to the question of whether to play optimally given the current knowledge, or to attempt to increase knowledge at the risk of unknown losses. KS solve this problem in the context of MDPs by using the fact that, if we know the value of the optimal policy of the MDP, we can, at each stage, examine whether we have learned enough to guarantee ourselves this value. Once this is the case, the agent needs no longer explore. Unfortunately, in SGs, this is not the case. Because of the ability of the adversary to hide parts of the game matrix, in many cases, we lack the information to calculate the value of a given policy. To overcome this, we employ techniques introduced by Monderer and Tennenholtz in the context of learning in repeated games 7] . Namely, we must explore at two levels. First, as in E 3 , we must perform global exploration.
That is, we must attempt to learn some facts about di erent games. In addition, we must perform local exploration as well, in order to extend our knowledge about particular games. Because it depends on the behavior of the adversary, this local exploration part cannot be a-priori bounded. This is to be contrasted with the initial exploration phase of E 3 , which takes polynomial time.
The algorithm presented in this paper addresses these and other issues, and yields near optimal performance for the agent in time polynomial in the basic problem parameters. It is, to the best of our knowledge, the rst such result in the context of stochastic games. Previous algorithms for learning in stochastic games 6, 4] were not concerned with analytic treatment and proof of e ciency, nor dealt explicitly with the exploration vs. exploitation issue in an e cient manner. However, Littman does provide asymptotic convergence results.
In the following section we discuss single-controller stochastic games. In Section 3 we present our measure of complexity. In Section 4 we present our main Theorem, which makes use of two basic ideas. A discussion of the rst idea, based on a recent algorithm by Kearns and Singh 5] appears in Section 5. A discussion of the second idea, which is in the spirit of work on learning in repeated games, and in particular follows recent work by Monderer and Tennenholtz 7] , is presented in Section 6. The synthesis of these ideas into a complete algorithm is presented in Section 7. In Section 8 we show how our results are extended to general stochastic games. We conclude in Section 9. Appendix A contains a version of the Cherno bound result 2, 1] upon which we rely heavily in various proofs.
Preliminaries
We rst de ne Single-Controller-Stochastic-Games SCSG]:
De nition 1 A single-controller-stochastic-game SCSG] M on states S = f1; : : :; Ng, and actions A = fa 1 ; : : :; a k g, consists of:
Stage Games: each state s 2 S is associated with a zero-sum game in strategic form, where the action set of each agent is A. The rst player is termed agent and the second player is termed adversary.
Probabilistic Transition Function: P M (s; t; a) is the probability of a transition from s to t given that the rst player (the agent) plays a.
For ease of exposition we normalize the payo s of each state game to be non-negative real numbers between 0 and a constant P max (i.e. the sum of the players' payo s for any joint action is always P max ). We will also take the number of actions to be constant. The set of possible histories of length t is (S A 2 ) t , and the set of possible histories, H, is the union of the sets of possible histories for all t 0, where the set of possible histories of length 0 is S. Given an SCSG, a policy for the agent is a mapping from H to the set of possible probability distributions over A. Hence, a policy determines the probability of choosing each particular action for each possible history. A stationary policy is a policy which depends only on S instead of on H. Such a policy associates with each state a probability distribution on the actions.
Given an SCSG M and a natural number T, we denote the expected T-step undiscounted average reward of a policy when the adversary follows a policy , and where both and are executed starting from a state s 2 S, by U M (s; ; ; T) (we omit subscripts denoting the SCSG when this causes no confusion). Let U M (s; ; T) = min is a policy U M (s; ; ; T) denote the value that can guarantee in T steps starting in s. If U M (s; ; T) is independent of s we denote it by U M ( ; T). We also denote U M (s; ) = lim inf T!1 U M (s; ; T), and U M ( ) = lim inf T!1 U M ( ; T) when the value is independent of s.
In the sequel we will assume that the SCSG is ergodic in the sense that given any stationary policy of the agent, the probability of transition between each pair of states is greater than 0 regardless of the adversary behavior. This makes the value of each stationary policy well-de ned (i.e., it is independent of the initial state). In particular, the value of M is the value U M ( ) of an optimal policy (and we know that for SCSGs, there is no loss of generality in assuming this policy is stationary).
The ergodicity assumption is consistent with the treatment of 5], and is quite natural for the following reasons. Any Markov chain de ned by a policy has one or more absorbing subsets of states. That is, subsets of the state space such that once the agent enters them, he will remain in them. In the initial stages of learning, the agent cannot be expected to know which policies will lead to which sets of absorbing states, and so we cannot really in uence the choice of an absorbing state set. However, once we are within such a set, we would like to quickly learn how to behave. This is basically what we (and KS) o er.
Our Measure of Complexity
One of the important contributions of KS is the identi cation of the central parameter upon which the analysis of algorithms for learning in MDPs must be based, namely, the mixing time. Kearns and Singh 5] argue that it is unreasonable to refer to the e ciency of learning algorithms without referring to the e ciency of convergence to a desired value. They de ned the -return mixing time of a stationary policy to be the smallest value of T after which guarantees an expected payo of at least U( ) ? . More formally, in the context of SCSGs we say that a policy belongs to the set ( ; T) of stationary policies whose -return mixing time is at most T, if after time T, returns an expected (average, undiscounted) payo of at least U( ) ? for every possible adversary behavior. That is, on the average, we have to employ T steps of policy until our average accumulated reward is su ciently close to the value of . Notice that this means that an agent with perfect information about the nature of the games and the transition function will require at least T steps, on the average, in order to obtain a value (of almost) v using an optimal policy whose -return mixing time is T. Clearly, one cannot expect an agent lacking this information to perform better.
Notice that the mixing time of a policy depends on the adversary's behavior: The agent's accumulated reward depends on his actions and on the adversary's actions. Hence, the adversary can in uence the time it takes to obtain a particular sum of rewards, and we must take this into account. Luckily, in SCSGs, we can show that the mixing time of any policy is nite. This follows from the following observations. First, notice that given a stationary policy, if we disregard the payo s obtained in each state, we get a standard Markov chain. 1 Now, given a particular stationary policy of the agent, the best response of the adversary is static, in the sense that it is built from best response actions at each state. If the adversary will use a di erent strategy from this best response strategy, the payo of the agent will only increase. (Again, in SGs in general this is not true, since the adversary can in uence the transition probabilities.) For a xed policy of the adversary, it is possible to calculate the appropriate mixing time. As we have just observed, any deviation from this behavior will only increase the payo s to the agent, thus decreasing the time needed to obtain the desired value.
We denote by Opt( ( ; T)) the optimal expected undiscounted average return from among the policies in ( ; T). When looking for an optimal policy (with respect to policies that mix at time T, for a given > 0), we will be interested in approaching this value. In our algorithm, we shall assume that T and Opt( ( ; T)) are given, and we shall attempt to learn a behavior whose average return is within from Opt( ( ; T)). Once this problem is solved, we can, as in 5], remove these assumptions and measure the complexity as a function of the mixing time of the (stationary) optimal policy, where this value, as well as the value of the game are a-priori unknown.
The Main Theorem
Recall that we wish to obtain e cient behavior in stochastic games for agents that do not know the transition probabilities a-priori, nor do they know which games are associated with each state. We can show:
Theorem 1 Given an SCSG M with N states and some > 0, denote the stationary policies with -return mixing time T, by M ( ; T), and the optimal expected return achievable by such policies by Opt( M ( ; T)). Let 0 < ; < 1 be constants. Then, there exists an algorithm LSG, which takes N; T; ; ; as inputs, and is polynomial in N; T; Two features are immediately apparent from the statement of this theorem: We have to pay a small additive factor because of the fact that, as in MDPs, one cannot guarantee an optimal payo within a bounded amount of time { a fact that holds even when we have an explicit, correct model. We also have to pay a multiplicative 1 ? factor which results from the ability of the adversary to hide desired information { in order to overcome this, we must perform some sampling throughout the process, which costs us a small, multiplicative loss.
The proof of this theorem relies on the following observations:
1. Since SCSGs share much structure with MDPs, we can adopt many aspects of Kearns and Singh's E 3 algorithm to this context. One of the fundamental ideas in this algorithm is the de nition of a known state, i.e., a state for which the agent has accumulated su ciently accurate statistics with regards to both rewards and transitions originating from it. We will adopt a similar notion, and utilize it similarly. However, in our case, the rewards for di erent actions depend on the actions taken by the adversary, who may act maliciously. Hence, careful adaptation of this notion is required for our context. Once this is done, we can follow the ideas of 5], regarding the exploitation vs. global exploration issue. This point is discussed in Section 5. 2. Suppose that we have been able to learn some information about a particular game, and we attempt to employ an optimal policy with respect to this information. For example, suppose that we have learned two out of three columns of a given game. 2 However, so far, we do not have knowledge of what happens when the adversary chooses this third action. Furthermore, suppose that some action a is the optimal action when the adversary sticks to the two actions we are familiar with. We have the following dilemma: we could try to exploit our current information about the game, and decide to play a. However, if the adversary chooses to start playing his third action now, and a is inadequate against this action, we will attain low returns. On the other hand,
we could decide that we need to explore the whole game rst, playing randomly until we learn enough about the third column. However, we have no guarantee that the adversary will actually play the third action and so we may learn nothing new while continuously attaining sub-optimal returns. This issue is what we referred to earlier as the local explore vs. exploit problem, and our main problem will be to nd some reasonable tradeo between these two options, one that will allow us to achieve the desired level of performance. This issue is discussed in Section 6.
Proof: First, we prove the theorem with the following modi cation: instead of claiming the above for every state s and policy , we will claim it for every state s, policy , and xed adversary policy . Clearly, if this holds, then the actual statement holds given that U M (s; ; T) def = min U M (s; ; e; T). In the case where the adversary's policy is xed, inspection of the proof of the Simulation Lemma of 5] shows that precisely the same argument applies here, if we assume that both M and M have the same number of columns in each game. Hence, the only di erence is the introduction of the second point which allows for games that di er from each other, but where one is restricted to contain a subset of the adversary's actions. However, when the adversary is restricted in its choice of actions, it can only attain lower payo s (resulting in higher payo for the agent). The last argument in the proof of Lemma 1 may lead the reader to think that the second item in de nition 2 plays an insigni cant role. However, as we now discuss, this aspect of the de nition relates to the major concept of this section, that of known states.
We say that a state is known if we know its associated transition probabilities within a range of O( NTPmax ) 2 from their true value, and we know at least one column in it. That is, the transitions and rewards associated with all actions of the agent and at least one action of the adversary are known. This de nition is non-trivial. In particular, notice that it ignores the fact that outcomes which are not associated with a fully known column might be relevant. Hence, when we say that a state is known we do not imply that complete empirical evidence about the state exists. This point is crucial, and is the topic of the following section. Nevertheless, this de nition su ces for us to apply Kearns and Singh's ideas in our context. 4. For any states s; t 2 L, and a 2 A, we have that P M (s; t; a) = P M L (s; t; a). 5. For every s 2 L, and t 6 2 L, and for every action a 2 A, we have that P M L (s; t; a) = 0. 6. For every s 2 L, and a 2 A, we have that P M L (s; l 0 ; a) = j6 2L P M (s; t; a).
What follows is the SCSG version of 5]'s \Explore or Exploit" lemma.
Lemma 2 Let M be an SCSG. Let L be any subset of S, and let M L be the corresponding induced SCSG. Then, for any s 2 L, and for every T and 0 < < 1, we have that there exists a policy in M L such that U M L (s; ; T) U M (s; ; T) ? (where denotes the corresponding T-step optimal policy in M), or there exists a policy in M L such that the probability that a walk of T steps of that policy will reach l 0 exceeds Pmax for every adversary behavior.
The
are associated with fully known columns, then one can either nd a policy which, if run for T steps, attains the desired value (i.e., an exploitation policy), or a policy that, with su cient probability, will reach some unknown state (i.e., an exploration policy). The exploration policy is attained by looking for an optimal policy inM L , whereM L is de ned much as M L , but such that in l 0 the adversary obtains 0 for every joint action, and in L the adversary obtains P max for any joint action.
Let us sum up the observations and ideas discussed so far. The basic idea is to de ne a known state as a state which has been visited enough times to collect meaningful statistical data on one column of the game matrix at least. When an agent reaches an unknown state it will randomly select an action and execute it. (Notice that we cannot employ the balanced wandering approach of KS, since an adversary can exploit this to prevent learning). After polynomially many steps, at least one state will become known with su cient probability.
When an agent reaches a known state, it will perform exploration or exploitation depending on the outcome of the calculation described in the explore or exploit lemma. This calculation (where we compute the optimal expected T-steps return in M L , where L is the set of known states) must be repeated each time a new state becomes known or a new column becomes known. This can be e ciently computed (as a function of N and T) using standard dynamic programming updates. If this value is not close enough to the desired value we will generate an exploration step in order to reach an unknown state and make additional random sampling of actions. Notice that after at most polynomially many stages, with high probability, all states become known or the value can be obtained. (Recall, we assume that the adversary plays according to the known columns only.)
Eventually, we reach a situation where we know a policy that with high probability will attain the desired value assuming that the adversary executes actions which correspond to the fully known columns of each game. However, the adversary, of course, could well play actions corresponding to unknown columns, leading to a payo lower than expected. In the following section we explain how this problem is dealt with.
Exploitation with Local Exploration
In the previous sections we modi ed the de nition of a known state introduced by KS in order to adapt their techniques to the context of stochastic games. However, we saw that an adversary can exploit the existence of unknown columns within a known state, if we are not careful. To handle this problem, we adopt techniques from the work of Monderer and Tennenholtz 7] on learning in repeated games. Lemma 3 Consider an SCSG M with N states and k actions, where the transition probabilities are known and at least one column at each state is (fully) known. Consider the policies 3 The only di erence is in one equality that turns into a weak inequality in the appropriate direction.
whose -return mixing time is T, and let 0 < ; < 1. There exists an algorithm polynomial in T; N; 1 ; 1 ; 1 such that its execution polynomially many steps leads to an expected average payo of (1 ? )(Opt( ( ; T)) ? ) with probability of at least 1 ? .
Proof: The algorithm runs in stages that last at most T-steps. At each such stage, a T-step optimal policy with respect to known columns only, , is computed. We know that has an expected payo of at least Opt( ( ; T) ? ), provided that the adversary selects only actions which correspond to known columns. However, as there is no guarantee that the adversary will act this way, we execute a policy m instead of . m is equivalent to with probability of 1 ? 2 , and with probability of 2 it randomly selects a time i between 1 and T and an action, and when the i-th step in the execution is reached it executes this randomly chosen action.
A stage is considered nished if either: (1) the policy has been executed for T steps, or (2) either the adversary used an action that corresponds to an unknown column or the agent deviated from .
It can be shown that the probability that unknown columns will be selected ( 2T kNX ) 3 k 2 N times before all entries are known is less than k 2 Ne ?2kNTX . This follows from the fact that (1) the probability of failure of learning all columns in at least one set (from among k 2 N sets) of ( 2T kNX ) 3 adversary deviations (i.e. selections of unknown columns) is smaller than k 2 N times the probability of failing to learn in one such set of deviations, and that (2) > k 2 N , or X > log( k 2 N ) 2kN T . As can be directly observed from these inequalities, we can indeed choose (polynomial) X and Y that satisfy these conditions.
To complete the proof we need to show that we obtain the desired expected value. This follows from the fact that after Y stages (with the corresponding probability) only at most 2 of the stages correspond to adversary deviations, while in 1 ? 2 of the stages an expected payo of (1 ? 2 )(Opt( ( ; T)) ? ) is obtained.
Hence, once we have reached a situation where we have a policy that can obtain the desired value if the adversary behaves "nicely", we can modify this policy to a policy which obtains almost the desired value or learns a new fact about the states (with overwhelming probability). Thus, we tradeo some exploitation for exploration in a manner that guarantees that if the adversary plays an unknown column polynomially many times, we will learn this column after a polynomial number of steps. If the adversary rarely plays that column, we will rarely encounter it, and so the possible losses stemming from the randomization e ect are almost surely insigni cant given a su ciently long (but polynomial) number of steps.
The Algorithm
The LSG algorithm can be executed for any desired number of steps t 1. For su ciently large values of t (polynomial in the problem parameters) a near optimal average return is guaranteed, as stated in Theorem 1. The run of m is halted whenever a deviation of the adversary from the actions associated with fully known columns is observed, when the agent deviates from , when we have reached an unknown state, or when a new column in a state in L becomes fully known. 5. Otherwise, a payo of Opt( M (T; ))? can not be obtained, and a (global) exploration policy 0 is executed (see Section 5) for T steps or until an unknown state is reached. This policy is guaranteed by Lemma 2 to reach a state outside L with probability of at least Pmax within T steps.
6. In all cases, whenever an entry in a state game is learned, the value of it is kept in memory.
It is clear (from Lemma 3) that the above algorithm is polynomial (i.e. leads to near optimal average return after polynomial time) in the appropriate parameters. It remains to be shown that this algorithm will yield the desired return with probability of at least 1? for a given > 0. To show this, we have to consider the four sources of failure of the algorithm. The rst three appear in the context of the E large (but still polynomial), the probability of an error larger than we wish for is small. Notice that, for this analysis, our de nition of known states enables us to ignore the fact the rewards in some columns are only partially known. 2. Repeated attempted explorations may fail to expose new information. This can be either because of failure to reach an unknown state and failure to sample a new entry in an unknown state. We can view a global exploration step, followed by random wandering, as a Bernoulli trial, with a constant positive probability of success of at least O( pmaxk ) for reaching an unknown state and exploring a new entry in that state.
The number of such trials which might be executed before all states become known can therefore be taken (since all of the trials can be treated as independent trials) to be polynomial, with a failure probability of at most 4 . Notice that in general, not all states need to become known.
3. When we perform T-step exploitation with no local exploration we reach an expected return of Opt( M (T; ))? , but the actual return may be lower. This point is handled by the fact that after polynomially local exploitations are carried out, Opt( M (T; ))? 3 2 can be obtained with a probability of failure of at most 4 . This is obtained by standard Cherno bounds, and makes use of the fact that the standard deviation of the expected reward in a T-step policy is bounded.
4. The agent may get a low payo because it does not know the entries in some column and does not learn new entries in unknown columns. This is handled by Lemma 3, where we can choose the failure probability, , as needed.
By making the failure probability less than 4 for each of the above stages, we are able to get the desired result.
Finally, we remove the assumptions that both the value and its -return mixing time are known. This is straightforward and almost identical to the treatment given by 5]. First, as to knowledge of the value, this is needed when we have to decide whether to explore or exploit. Lemma 2 states that we can either get enough return or we have a su ciently high probability of reaching a new state quickly. One can calculate this probability without knowledge of the value and perform exploration whenever this probability exceeds the desired bound. Notice that by employing this technique, with overwhelming probability we remain with known states only after polynomial time. At this point, we can compute an optimal policy. Hence, we can safely apply this exploration bias.
Next, we must deal with the lack of knowledge of T. The idea is as follows: from the proofs of the algorithm's properties, one can deduce some polynomial P in the problem parameters such that if T is the mixing-time, then after P(T) steps we are guaranteed, with probability 1 ? , the desirable return. Hence, we can simply attempt to run this algorithm for T = 1; 2; 3; : : :. For each value of T, we run the algorithm P(T) time. Suppose that T 0 is the mixing time, then after O(P(T 0 ) 2 ) steps, we will obtain the desirable return.
One thing to notice is that this algorithm does not have a nal halting time and will be applied continuously as long as the agent is functioning in its environment. The only caveat is that at some point our current mixing time candidate T will be exponential in the actual mixing time T 0 , at which point each step of the algorithm will require an exponential calculation. However, this will occur only after an exponential number of steps. This is true for the E 3 algorithm too.
Another point worth mentioning is that in SCSGs, the agent may never know some of the columns. Consequently, if is the optimal policy given full information about the game, the agent may actually converge to a policy 0 that di ers from , but which yields the best return given the adversary's actual behavior. This return will be no smaller than the return guaranteed by . The mixing time of 0 will, in general, di er from the mixing time of . However, we are guaranteed that if T 0 is the -return mixing time of , and v is its value, after time polynomial in T 0 , the agent's actual return will be at least v (subject to the deviations a orded by the theorem).
Extensions
Various modi cations and extensions of our results can be considered. Many of them refers to improvements of the complexity of our algorithm. However, what is probably the most important extension is the generalization of our result to the context of general (zero-sum) stochastic games.
The main di erence between SCSGs and general SGs is the ability of the adversary to in uence the state transitions. This has a number of implications as we discuss below.
First, the agent has much more to learn { instead of learning about transitions associated with its actions at each game, it must learn transitions associated with joint actions. However, the increase in learning time until a state becomes known (with respect to joint actions in at least one column) due to this problem is merely polynomial in jAj.
Second, stationary equilibria do not always exist in SGs nor are there polynomial time algorithms for the solution of such games (as before, we refer to the expected average undiscounted payo ). This makes it di cult to de ne the value of such games and to solve them in polynomial time. If the agent's policy is non-stationary then the fact every state is reachable at some point, does not imply that we can ignore the initial state s where the system has been initiated, since action selection may depend on s, and therefore the payo s may depend on s as well. We can overcome this if we restrict the set ( ; T) to stationary policies; this will eliminate problems with regard to determining the actual value of a policy in a way that is independent of the initial state (which is needed for the de nition of ( ; T)). Of course, this will restrict the power of the results obtained. However, notice that we do not require our learning algorithm to use stationary policies only; indeed, the computation of a T-step policy we carry out in Step 3 will usually result in a non-stationary policy and will take polynomial time in T.
A third, related problem is the de nition of the complexity parameters, namely, an appropriate generalization of the notion of mixing time. In fact, we shall stick to the current de nition of -return mixing time, as it is the most natural. As before, this is a lower bound on the number of steps an agent with full information about the game must execute in order to guarantee the desired return. However, whereas in the case of MDPs and SCSGs we can guarantee that this time be nite, this is not known to hold for SGs in general. In the case of SCSGs, each stationary policy of the agent induced a Markov chain with its associated steady-state distribution. Now, unless the adversary follows a stationary policy { an inappropriate assumption to make { we can not talk about a steady state distribution. Nevertheless, the notion of -return mixing time is still appropriate.
Given the above, we can go ahead and check the modi cations needed for our algorithm to handle the more general case of stochastic games. One modi cation is related to the notion of a known state, and was mentioned above. In SGs, we know a column of a game only after each joint action associated with this column is executed enough times; however, the adversary controls its actions, and therefore may a ect the success of learning. Nevertheless, this requires only a relatively small modi cation to the de nition and use of a known state; a state is termed known if at at least one column of the game associated with it is known and all the transition probabilities associated with joint actions in this column are known with high accuracy. It is easy to see that, with su ciently high probability, after polynomially many visits to a state this information will become known. Similarly, in Section 6 we observed that we are able to either behave in a close to optimal manner or to detect the value of an unknown entry in polynomially many stages. Detecting the value of an entry in this case is not enough; the entry should be visited (polynomially) many times before we can say we know this entry. Again, a similar modi cation will handle this problem, and we will simply need to execute procedures of the form m many more times before guaranteeing the desired behavior. The number of executions will remain polynomial, though.
Finally, we can check that the three major lemmas used can be extended to stochastic games. Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 can be extended with the slight modi cation noted above. However, Lemma 2 requires a bit more work. Notice that this lemma tells us that if we cannot obtain su cient value, we can, with su cient probability, reach an unknown state quickly. However, this result is obtained with respect to a game in which some columns are deleted. In SCSGs, this raised no di culty since the agent controls the transitions and the adversary could not in uence its probability of reaching a particular state. However, now, this result holds only if the adversary does not use any action corresponding to a deleted column. Of course, we cannot guarantee this. Hence, we must combine local exploration within global exploration. That is, rather then pursue a policy that leads to an unknown state quickly, the agent must introduce some random actions, as in local exploration. This will guarantee that if the adversary plays an action corresponding to an unknown column, the agent has some probability of learning a new entry. The analysis of this re nement would be similar to that of Lemma 3.
Conclusion
We described an algorithm for learning in stochastic games. This algorithm extends earlier work of Kearns and Singh 5] on learning in MDPs using the techniques of Monderer and Tennenholtz for learning in repeated games 7]. The algorithm was described for the sub-class of single-controller stochastic games and its extension to the general case of SGs was outlined. In describing the algorithm we aimed for clarity rather than e ciency, with the sole constraint of providing a polynomial time algorithm. A more careful analysis will lead to reduced running time. It is worth noting a simple, but interesting, corollary of our results. If the algorithm is run concurrently by the agent and the adversary, where we consider stochastic games with stationary equilibrium, they are both guaranteed to attain near optimal performance, i.e., the value of the game (within the allowed error bounds). Finally, we remark that our algorithm would seem a natural candidate for learning in non-stochastic environment, although additional assumptions about the nature of the environment could be used to improve its e ciency.
A Cherno Bounds
In our analysis we make use of the following very powerful result: Theorem 2 (Cherno ) Let X i ; 1 i n be mutually independent with all E(X i )=0 and all X i 1. Let S = X 1 + X 2 + + X n . Then, Pr S > a] < e ?a 2 2n .
By appropriate normalization the above result can be applied in a straightforward manner to X i s with some constant expectation and bounds on their values. This is indeed the case in our study; this is easily implied by the fact the entries in the game matrices are taken to be bounded.
To illustrate the way that the bound is used, consider a sequence of n trials (e.g. exploitations which use an optimal policy), where X i measures the deviation from desired quantity, C, at trial i (e.g. the deviation from the expected optimal payo ). Now take for example a = n 2 3 , then we get that Pr S > n 2 3 ] < e ?n 1 3 . Hence, with overwhelming probability (exponential in n), we get that the deviation of the actual average of the X i s from the desired value is negligible (and smaller or equal to n ? 1 3 = n 2 3 n .). This implies that if we are able to obtain a desired expected value, then by polynomially many repetitions we will be able to actually obtain it with overwhelming probability.
